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RÉSUMÉ
Nous utilisons des données américaines provenant du National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY) pour examiner l'effet de la formation formelle en lieu de travail par rapport
à la mobilité observée des jeunes travailleurs américains. Des modèles de durée
paramétriques nous permettent d'évaluer l'impact économique de la formation sur le
temps productif passé avec un employeur. Nos résultats sont cohérents avec la plupart
des études précédentes, qui trouvaient un impact positif et significatif. Cependant, la durée
de la relation de travail nette du temps passé en formation n'augmente pas de manière
significative. Nous procédons par la suite à l'analyse de la mobilité intrasectorielle et
intersectorielle àfin de permettre l'inférence par rapport à la spécificité du capital humain
acquis par la formation, soit du capital humain spécifique à la firme, soit spécifique à
l'industrie, soit général. L'analyse économétrique permet de rejeter un modèle séquentiel
de choix de secteur en faveur d'un modèle à risques concurrents. Nos résultats présentent
une forte évidence en faveur de la spécificité de la formation à l'industrie. La probabilité
d'un changement de secteur d'activité suite à une séparation d'emploi décroît avec la
formation reçue dans l'industrie présente, peu importe si celle-ci a été reçue du dernier
employeur ou d'un employeur précédent. La probabilité de détenir un emploi suite à une
séparation augmente avec la formation sur le tas. Ces résultats sont robustes à des
variations du modèle de base.
Mots clés : formation sur le tas, durée de l'emploi, mobilité sectorielle, capital humain
spécifique au secteur, modèles de durée paramétriques, modèle à risques
concurrents
ABSTRACT
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we re-examine
the effect of formal on-the-job training on mobility patterns of young American workers. By
employing parametric duration models, we evaluate the economic impact of training on
productive time with an employer. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive and
statistically significant impact of formal on-the-job training on tenure with the employer
providing the training. However, the expected net duration of the time spent in the training
program is generally not significantly increased. We proceed to document and analyze
intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral mobility patterns in order to infer whether training
provides firm-specific, industry-specific, or general human capital. The econometric
analysis rejects a sequential model of job separation in favor of a competing risks
specification. We find significant evidence for the industry-specificity of training. The
probability of sectoral mobility upon job separation decreases with training received in the
current industry, whether with the last employer or previous employers, and employment
attachment increases with on-the-job training. These results are robust to a number of
variations on the base model.
Key words : on-the-job training, employment duration, sectoral mobility, industry-specific
human capital, parametric duration models, competing risks model
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Abstract   R sum 
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth  NLSY we reexamine the
eect of formal onthejob training on mobility patterns of young American workers By
employing parametric duration models we evaluate the economic impact of training on
productive time with an employer Conrming previous studies we nd a positive and
statistically signicant impact of formal onthejob training on tenure with the employer
providing the training However expected duration net of the time spent in the training
program is generally not signicantly increased We proceed to document and analyze
intrasectoral and crosssectoral mobility patterns in order to infer whether training pro
vides rmspecic industryspecic or general human capital The econometric analysis
rejects a sequential model of job separation in favor of a competing risks specication
We nd signicant evidence for the industryspecicity of training The probability of
sectoral mobility upon job separation decreases with training received in the current
industry whether with the last employer or previous employers and employment at
tachment increases with onthejob training These results are robust to a number of
variations on the base model
Nous utilisons des donn es am ricaines provenant du National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth NLSY pour examiner leet de la formation formelle en lieu de travail par rap
port  la mobilit  observ e des jeunes travailleurs am ricains Des modles de dur e
param triques nous permettent d valuer limpact  conomique de la formation sur le
temps productif pass  avec un employeur Nos r sultats sont coh rents avec la plupart
des  tudes pr c dents	 qui trouvaient un impact positif et signi
catif Cependant	 la dur e
de la r lation de travail nette du temps pass  en formation naugmente pas de manire
signi
cative Nous proc dons par la suite  lanalyse de la mobilit  intrasectoriel et in
tersectoriel  
n de permettre linf rence par rapport  la sp ci
cit  du capital humain
acquis par la formation	 soit du capital humain sp ci
que  la 
rme	 soit sp ci
que 
lindustrie	 soit g n ral Lanalyse  conom trique permet de rejeter un modle s quentiel
de choix de secteur en faveur dun modle  risques concurrents Nos r sultats pr sentent
de l vidence forte en faveur de la sp ci
cit  de la formation  lindustrie La probabilit 
dun changement de secteur dactivit  suite  une s paration demploi d crot avec la
formation reue dans lindustrie pr sente	 peu importe si celleci a  t  reue du dernier
employeur ou dun employeur pr c dent La probabilit  de detenir un emploi suite 
une s paration augmente avec la formation sur le tas Ces r sultats sont robustes  des
variations du modle de base
Keywords  Onthejob Training Employment duration Sectoral mobility Industryspecic human
capital Parametric duration models Competing risks model
JEL  J Human Capital Formation J Specic Human Capital J Sectoral Mobility
Mots cls  Formation sur le tas dur	e de l
emploi mobilit	 sectoriel capital humain sp	cique au
secteur modle de dur	e param	trique modle  risques concurrents
JEL  J Formation de capital humain J Capital humain sp	cique J Mobilit	 sectoriel

 Almost half  of British business people surveyed preferred to poach trained workers
rather than to educate them and more than a third worried that trained people were more
likely to leave the company 
The Economist 
  Introduction
Recent focus on the issue of whether wages rise with tenure or with experience have revealed the
importance of controlling for the industry in which experience was acquired
 
 A parallel literature
has focused on the eect of formal employer	provided training on wages and mobility Barron

Berger  Black 
 Lynch 
 Lynch a
 Parent forthcominga Missing is the link between
training and industry mobility This paper attempts to redress this lack using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth NLSY We model the transition pattern of young workers
using duration and competing risks models
 which allows us to integrate industry mobility The
objective is to document dierential eects of training on industry stayers as opposed to industry
changers and those workers who leave employment all together
This paper diers from the previous literature in the way we treat mobility The analysis in this
literature usually concerns only the expected duration with a given rm conditional on training

without regard to where the job changer changes to
 once she quits her job Most authors have used
Cox partial likelihood
 ignoring the baseline hazard
 and can thus only provide information on the
sign
 but not the magnitude of the impact of training Lynch a
 Parent forthcominga Gritz
 used competing risks models
 but considered only the eect of training on the duration and
frequency of employment spells without regard to either specic jobs nor industry tenure
Our goal is twofold The initial quotation points to the worries involved Are workers more likely
to leave their current rm after receipt of training Though previous studies have found a positive
eect of training on tenure
 we argue that this is not enough
 since measured tenure includes the time
 
Neal   Parent   See Altonji  Shakotko  	 Abraham  Farber  	 and Topel   for the
framework in which this debate occurs

spent in training  In this paper we measure the eect of training on duration by using parametric
duration models  We nd that the quoted worries though exaggerated may be justied  The
statistically signicant impact of training found in previous studies is not economically signicant 
The second concern is a followup question to the previous one  When workers leave where
do they go to and what information is provided by mobility patterns We provide new evidence
on the connection between training and the mobility of the workers concerned by distinguishing
between intrasectoral and crosssectoral mobility as well as exits to nonemployment  We develop
a simple inspectiongood model of jobs as a function of the stock of	 human capital allowing
us to distinguish the degree of specicity of training  This model suggests using a competing risks
model to capture the eect of training on transitions to dierent states a model which we favor
against a sequential model of separation 
The paper is organized as follows  The following section reviews the theoretical framework of the
impact of training  Section 
 describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics  Section 
outlines the empirical model used and Section  presents the results  Section  concludes 
  Theoretical framework
Human capital theory though primarily interested in the wage and its remuneration of human
capital has implications as to the mobility of workers  This obviously depends on the degree of
specicity of the human capital acquired either through formal or informal training  Its theoretical
predictions however are based on a dichotomy between rmspecic and universallygeneral capital
formation  Recent empirical work Neal  Parent 	 has shown that this stark dichotomy may
be too imprecise and the amalgamation of the empirical results into some theoretical framework is
still lacking 
If human capital is general then the knowledge accumulated is of productive use elsewhere
irrespective of the company or the sector in which the training was received  Competitive pressures
come to play ensuring that workers get the full return on the investment and consequently pay for
all costs  In equilibrium the mobility of a trained worker is no dierent than that of an untrained


worker  The mobility aspects follow from the characteristics of the human capital itself 
 
If human
capital is rmspecic then theory nds that the returns and costs should be paid for by the rm
though turnover and transaction cost arguments lead to some splitting of both Becker 	
Hashimoto 
  Both worker and rm have an increased interest in sticking with the relationship
in the presence of specic capital and turnover should decrease  Similar results are obtained from
contract theory MacLeod  Malcomson 	 
The similar set of predictions may arise from matching theory Jovanovic b  A worker will
switch rms if her expected matchspecic utility is higher elsewhere  If training is rmspecic
it increases the value of the rmworker match and ceteris paribus decreases the value of other
arriving job oers to the worker thus probability of the worker switching rms Jovanovic a 
If on the other hand training is general then the value of all match draws are increased by the
same factor and we again obtain that there should be no impact on mobility  Finally if training is
industryspecic a combination of the two above arguments lead to a reduction of mobility across
industries though intraindustry mobility would not be aected  As a result conditional on leaving
the worker is more likely to take up a new job in the same industry 
However Spence like selection models may generate similar predictions with respect to
tenure and completed training

  If training serves as a test to discern good from bad workers then
workers who have completed training and thus successfully passed the test will be recognized as
good workers  If good workers tend to have longer tenures then the correlation between completed
training and tenure is not due to increased human capital but due to a separation of the good from
the bad invisible to an econometricians eye 
Against this stands a dierent type of selection story  Suppose that the rm has to choose
training recipients among workers whose productivity is unknown  However the rm can observe
other characteristics related to a workers mobility  Then for any type of training for which the
rm pays the rm will prefer less mobile workers in order to get the highest possible return on its
 
Transaction costs or other market imperfections may lead to some quasi rents in the relation between rm and
worker and to reduced mobility as a consequence Acemoglu  Pischke 	 However the reduction will be in the
baseline mobility and investment in general human capital will not a
ect mobility except under certain conditions	

E	g	 Salop  Salop  and Weiss  Wang 	 Margolis  provides evidence for a model of self 
selecting workers with heterogeneous hazards into rms o
ering di
erent seniority rewards	

investment  We would observe a correlation between training and tenure  From a human capital
point of view this correlation is spurious 
Previous  ndings
Most previous empirical studies have concentrated on the eects of training on wages and the
propensity to change jobs without distinguishing occupational and sectoral changes  Onthejob
training OJT increases wages with the current employer  As we have seen this could be consistent
with both general and rmspecic human capital  The literature is not clear on whether employers
remunerate OJT received from previous employers  Lynch 	b nds that these returns are
nil whereas Parent forthcominga and Loewenstein 
 Spletzer  using more representative
samples and more elaborate techniques nd that returns to previously obtained OJT are as high as
for training received with the current rm indicating that training is of a general nature  However
OJT does not seem to be paid for by the employee through reduced starting wages Barron et al 
 Loewenstein 
 Spletzer  Veum a which is consistent with the idea that human
capital thus formed is of a rmspecic nature  Disagreement occurs on whether these results are
also true for othejob training OFT  Whereas Lynch  nds that OFT is not remunerated by
the current employer Parent forthcominga shows that returns to training are the same independent
of the type of training and Veum a reports that OFT leads to higher starting wages as long
as it is nanced by employers 
Some results reported in the literature lend support to the mobilitybased selection story  For
instance results reported in Lynch 	b indicate that married workers and more experienced
workers are signicantly more likely to receive training where both characteristics are habitually
correlated with longer tenure 
 
Only a few studies have used duration analysis to look at the mobility patterns associated
with training  Estimates of duration models have shown that the probability of separation from
the current employer is reduced conditional on having received some OJT Lynch 	a Parent
forthcominga  Combined with the reported results on the wage eects of training this is interpreted
 
See also Altonji   Spletzer 

as evidence for the presence of some  rmspeci c component to formal training or at least in
contradiction with the interpretation of training as portable across employers In contrast a recent
paper Veum   nds no e	ect of onthejob training on tenure
 
Few previous studies and none in the training literature have considered the distinction between
intrasectoral mobility and crosssectoral mobility focusing only on duration on the job Neal 

and Parent 
 estimate the e	ects of industry mobility on wages but do not consider the
determinants of such mobility Their results showing that industry tenure explains away the entire
 rmspeci c tenure e	ect on wages is a  nding which is deeply related to the present paper since
it points to the presence of sectorspeci c informal human capital Neal  and McCall 
go one step further Neal  addresses the question of complexity of job changes He  nds
evidence that the propensity for crosssectoral changes decreases with industry experience but does
not relate these changes to training variables or job tenure McCall  considers occupational
matching  nding some evidence that previous experience in the same occupation increases tenure
in the current job Thomas  estimates a parametric model of sectoral mobility for persons
experiencing unemployment distinguishing exits from jobs only as to voluntary quits or involuntary
job losses and neglecting direct jobtojob transitions He  nds that the probability of changing
sectors increases with the duration of unemployment Furthermore tenure on the previous job
increases the duration of unemployment
A model of sector specic human capital
Most previous studies have thus been framed by the dichotomy between  rmspeci c and completely
general capital Nevertheless already Becker had in mind that human capital could be of use
elsewhere but not necessarily by everybody
 General training is useful in many  rms besides those providing it for example a
machinist trained in the army  nds his skills of value in steel and aircraft  rms and a
doctor trained at one hospital  nds his skills useful at other hospitals
 
Veum   uses a slightly dierent classication of training Furthermore he uses a subsample of our dataset

 Becker  pg 
Hence some training will be of use only to a restricted subset of all 	rms in the economy and will
therefore be less then completely general On the other hand there may well exist training which is
truly of use only to the training 	rm and other training one has only to think of word processing
skills that will be of use to such a large set of 	rms that we can truly say it is completely general
To 	x ideas consider the following model It is a model of jobs as inspection goods  Jovanovic

b coupled with the usual assumption of an increase in marginal product due to human capital
formation  Becker  There is no active job search but job oers arrive at constant rates
which may dier across sectors
 
There are two sectors By convention the worker is initially
employed in sector  receiving a  log wage w
 
   k a positive function of the stock of human
capital  k For simplicity we assume a linear function  k    k The degree of transferability of
human capital to other 	rms and sectors is denoted by 
i
 i     and without loss of generality

i
are either unity or zero  
i
  f g The 	rm pays for the training irrespective of its speci	city
and the workers wage is increasing in k     Oers w
i
k arrive at a constant rate r A fraction
q of oers comes from sector  Both sectors are competitive and in each sector  log wage oers
 the value of worker	rm matches are normally distributed with mean  k
i
and variance    

The worker will switch 	rms andor sectors if he receives a wage oer w
i
k  w
 
k which occurs
with probability 
i
w
 
kw
i
k   F
i
w
 
 Abstracting from ties the probability of a sectoral
move per period the intersectoral transition intensity is 

k   r  q  F

w
 
 The intrasectoral
transition intensity is de	ned equivalently as 

k   r   q  F

w
 
 The hazard function k
is simply the sum of the transition intensities The probability of a sectoral move conditional on
leaving the current job is M

k   



 

   qF

  qF

 qF

	 Suppose that initially
k    hence all distributions have the same mean
If training the process of human capital acquisition is 	rmspeci	c then 

  

   Industry
speci	c capital is the case where 

   and 

   training is perfectly portable within the same
sector but not across sectors Finally general training is portable across sectors hence 

  

  
 
Similar in spirit  but without the emphasis on mobility  is Stevens 

We assume that the variance is equal across sectors This is a sucient condition  but not necessary for our
results to hold


Now consider the acquisition of dk units of human capital through training  Initially all distri
butions have mean zero  
 
   r   q  

   r     q    r and M
 
 rq  If training
is rmspecic then F
i
 w

k   for i     Both transition intensities decline and so does
the hazard  This is so because the rm will share part of the return on human capital with the
worker
 
and match most outside wage oers  The conditional probability of a sectoral move M
 
 k
however is unchanged since the desirability of wage oers from both sectors relative to the current
wage decline in the same manner 
If training is general then both transitions intensities remain unchanged and so does the overall
hazard 

Furthermore as in the rmspecic case M
 
 kk   since the desirability of wage
oers from both sectors increase in the same manner 
However if training is industry specic the transition intensity to Sector  decreases i e 
 
 
 kk   but the transition intensity to the same sector remains unchanged  

 kk  
since the mean productivity for other rms in the same sector increases by the same amount as for
the present rm  This implies that the conditional probability of a sectoral move M
 
 k decreases
since sign M
 
 kk  sign  

 
 
k   
 
 

k    Note that the hazard  also declines
although by less than in the rmspecic case 
Thus it is possible to distinguish the three cases by estimating the conditional probability
of a sectoral move  A reduction in this probability following the acquisition of human capital is
inconsistent with both rmspecic and general human capital 
The model can easily be extended to include nonemployment as a third sector  Wage oers
from the nonemployment sector can be interpreted as shocks to the reservation wage  Assume
that w

 k   i e  human capital has no eect on leisure  The hazard is now dened as the sum
over all three transition intensities  Dene M
job
   

 
 
 the conditional probability of nding
a job  Under the above assumptions  

always declines in k  Hence for 

 
 
  M
job
k  
but for the other two cases M
job
k    This is another way of saying that conditional	 labor
force attachment increases with training if training is not rmspecic but remains unchanged in
 
This was suggested by Becker   and formalized by Hashimoto  	

Note that in this model everything is observable	 Any informational rent obtained by the employer may lead to
di
erent predictions  Acemoglu  Pischke 	


the case of more general training  M
 
is now reinterpreted as the probability of a sectoral change
conditional on being employed in the next period  Table  on page  summarizes the testable
hypotheses 
Table  here 
Though essentially a model of job quits the model also has implications as to training received
in previous jobs where separation may have occurred as a layo  If training received on previous
jobs was rmspecic then in subsequent jobs it is as if the worker had never received this training
and previously received training should have no impact on any of the above measures  In particular
the eect of such training on the hazard should be nil  If training is industryspecic it obviously
depends on whether training was acquired in the same industry or not  If it was then we obtain the
same predictions as for industryspecic capital above as if the current company itself had provided
the industryspecic training  On the other hand if it was not then the eect is the same as for
previously acquired rmspecic capital i e  zero  Finally if training is general in nature then the
only eects are a reduction in the transition intensity to nonemployment and as a consequence an
increase in conditional labor force attachment 
Procedural outline
In this paper we take a closer look at mobility patterns of workers in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth  First we estimate parametric duration models  In order to discern a tenure
lengthening eect of onthejob training we argue that tenure should increase by more than the
time spent in the training program itself  The increase needs to be greater than the fulltime
equivalent of the duration of the training program itself for there to be an economic impact of
training  Hence if a 	week training program increases expected tenure by 	 weeks we argue
that the economic impact the net increase is nil  Our results show that in general training has
no such economic impact on tenure casting doubt on the interpretation of training as rmspecic
human capital 
Is the measure of 
net increase appropriate In the sense that formal training is usually dis

pensed in a classroom setting  separate from productive activities  this seems to us uncontroversial
In the case of apprenticeships  this may be less so  since apprenticeships are a mix of learningby
doing and classroom settings However  even in the case of apprenticeships  the net increase will
give us an indication of how strong the tenure eect of training truly is
We then proceed to estimate the conditional probabilities as suggested by the above model in
a competing risks framework If training does in fact contain a rmspecic component  then we
would expect training to signicantly reduce exits to all destinations  which is already reected in a
reduction of the overall job separation hazard If training is industryspecic  we would expect no
eect on intrasectoral mobility  and a negative eect on intersectoral mobility Finally  a nding
that training has no eect on mobility is consistent with general human capital
  Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth NLSY	 has followed 
  individuals since 
 
originally selected for being between 
 and 
 years of age The survey tracks among other
things	 their employment  schooling and training We use data from all waves of the NLSY up until

 Jobs are excluded if their starting dates are before 
 We use all reported training spells to
compute total training excluding education	 received However  it should be pointed out that prior
to 
  only training spells longer than  weeks were reported  and this might bias the controls for
previous training received The only alternative  ie taking into account persons who entered the
labor force after 
 
  
is even less attractive as an alternative Individuals who have their rst job
contact after 
 are at least 
 years old  and this cannot be considered a representative sample
even of the youth population
A further constraint could be that the NLSY contains information on a maximum of ve job
spells and four training spells having occurred since the last interview In practice  only about one
percent of persons holding at least one job since the last interview also provide information on a
fth job  and on average only 
 percent of those receiving at least one training spell also provide
  
No training questions were asked in   However the questions in   refer to training received since  
last interview


information on a third or fourth training spell 
  
Thus this restriction does not seem to impose a
major constraint 
Table  here 
In our analysis we exclude persons in the military subsample and not working for private
companies 
  
We also exclude workers who have not entered the labor force on a permanent basis 
To be included a worker had to work for at least  weeks and on average at least  hours per
week for at least  of the next  years  For these individuals we keep all valid jobspell observations
including those before the permanent transition arguing that training may be received before the
worker permanently transits into the work force 

The nal sample includes 	 	
 observations
for   individuals  For the econometric analysis we also eliminate all job spells less than  weeks
in length  Table  on page  provides more details 

Sample means for the full sample and the
subsample with strictly positive training are given in Table 
 on page 
 
Table  and Table 
 here 
Time frame for search activities
To construct transition data we need to dene appropriate exit states  In the simplest transition
model the state following an employment spell can be easily dened  A person is either employed
  
To be more precise  In the years in which up to three training spells of at least  weeks could be reported
only  percent of those receiving at least one training spell also reported a third training spell In later years
respondents were asked about a maximum of  spells of at least a week in length and the corresponding number
then is  percent
  
We also experimented with excluding the oversampled population which reduces the sample size to  	
observations for   individuals Since the results did not change we used all observations for the results reported
here

None of the results seem to change if we include workers not satisfying this criterion

Parent 
forthcominga uses essentially the same sample minus two years His nal sample only includes 	
observations However his exclusion restrictions are more severe Using a four years instead of his six to exclude
transitory workers leaves us with a larger sample 
see previous footnote Furthermore he excludes workers with
less than two completed spells In our sample about  percent of all spells are censored Finally and perhaps the
major dierence he excludes all workers occupying more than one job at the same time We have not implemented
this distinction We base our identication of transitions on the primary job code in the work history data le of
the NLSY Ignoring the presence of dual jobs we may capture some jobtojob transitions which are in fact only a
reallocation of time towards the second job In a certain sense this is also a job and possibly an industry transition
Furthermore we believe though we have not checked that onthejob 
though not othejob training will occur
with the employer with whom the worker works the highest number of hours which is the criterion used to designate
the primary job in the work history le and that it is unlikely that a worker will receive training with two employers
simultaneously However we acknowledge that the impact of these restrictions remains to be evaluated
		
in another job  which might be in the same or in a dierent industry She may have enlisted in
the military  she may be unemployed or have withdrawn from the labor market In this paper  we
will describe three dierent types of transitions only transitions to jobs within the same industry 
transitions to jobs in a dierent twodigit
  
industry  and nonemployment  which groups not only
the obvious economic denition  but also those transitions which end in military enlistment
However  in doing this  we have not completely solved our problem Since our model is a
partial equilibrium model using singlecycle data  we need to do some aggregation in the temporal
dimension In other words  when a person leaves a job  when does she arrive in the new state If
this person suers  days of unemployment between two jobs  do we classify this transition as a
transition to a new job  or to unemployment What if the unemployment spell between two jobs is
three months In a more complete  multiplecycle analysis  we would include the eect of previous
onthejob training on the probability of exiting from unemployment  and this question would not
be a problem However  to keep the econometrics a bit simpler  we introduce some simplications 
and heuristically test for their impact later
We thus argue that the rst transition should be coded as a jobtojob transition  since it is
more likely that the new job was lined up before the old job ended than otherwise 

and that hence
unemployment or nonemployment	 is likely to be voluntary The second transition  however 
should be coded as a jobtounemployment transition  again on the grounds that it is more likely
that unemployment was involuntary  rather than voluntary More precisely  we assume that any job
started within a window of s weeks of having left another job qualies as a jobtojob transition
In other words  after having left one job at time t  any unemployment spell from t to t   s is not
taken into account We then test the robustness of our results to several dierent values of s
  
See Table   on page  for the industry grouping we use Oneandahalf digit industry would be more
appropriate since our classication is wider than onedigit SIC but narrower than twodigit SIC

Some control for linedup jobs is possible since in some years respondents were asked specically if they had a
new job lined up before leaving their last job In the present analysis we have not yet integrated this question


Information on training spells
A total of    categories have been allowed over the years for classication of the training institution
The job to be trained for is registered as well as duration intensity and if training was successfully
completed As interest in training increased over the years supplementary questions were added
Thus since   the respondent was asked whether her employer had sponsored training if the
training was used on the job if it helped or was necessary to get a promotion whether it helped in
getting a dierent job etc Questions were asked about the respondents evaluation of transferability
of the training received to other tasks and employers
We group three categories of training as on	the	job training

  
Apprenticeships are obviously
on	the	job as are training programs run by the employer We further classify training provided at
work by outside suppliers as on	the	job training arguing that this is also likely to be organized by
the employers All other training codes are considered o	the	job training

Training is a variable which by denition varies within a job and an appropriate econometric
model should allow for time	varying covariates In this paper we approximate the impact of time	
varying training by using completed hours of training at the time the worker leaves the rm

We also experiment with training intensity dened as hours of training per week of tenure and
computed using as above total hours of training received and total weeks of tenure Note that the
rst measure covaries in a mechanical fashion with tenure since an employee cannot receive  
weeks of training on a job that lasts  weeks The second measure is a correct measure if training
intensities were to be dened at the start of the job and if they did not vary over time A large
percentage of training occurs at the start of a job spell but the proportion of training in later years
is not nil Parent forthcominga Loewenstein  Spletzer   The results reported here should
hence be interpreted with caution
  
See Table   on page   for the complete listing of job categories

A dierent approach taken by Veum  b 	 is to use the information provided since 

 on who paid
for the direct costs of training

Parent forthcominga	 and Veum 	 use the same method Lynch a	 uses a timevarying specication
 
Preliminary data analysis
Some preliminary analysis is appropriate  In order to choose an appropriate baseline hazard a plot
of the raw hazard rate is of use to obtain some idea of the form of the baseline hazard  Panel  of
Figure  on page  shows the usual form of the exit hazard KaplanMeier estimates with a large
peak at around  weeks as rst noted by Farber 		  Note that the hazard is nonmonotonous
hence Weibull or exponential hazard models are would seem inappropriate 
Figure  on page  here 
The other panels of Figure  show plots obtained by graphing empirical transition intensities
to the appropriate states using di
erent values for the size of the transition window again using
KaplanMeier estimators  The functional form of transition intensities seems to remain the same
and does not seem to di
er across exit states although transitions to same industry jobs decline
less rapidly after the peak in the th week 
  
Note that the hazard for industry movers always lies
above the hazard for industry stayers  The implication as also reported by Table  on page  is
that young workers frequently change industry  It possibly reects search and matching activities
Neal 		  Furthermore it would appear that the relative probability of observing a change of
industries rather than a job in the same industry is not timeconstant a point we will approach
formally in the next two sections 
Table  here 
Figure  on page  shows how each transition intensities evolves when we change the size of the
transition window  Enlargening the length of the transition window increases both job transition
intensities by reducing the number of individuals who are classied as nonemployed though the
transition intensity to jobs in other industries seems to grow more strongly 

  Note that the
largest increase occurs when enlargening the window size from one to ve weeks whereas enlargening
 
No formal tests have been performed  and our methodology in the competing risk framework used here does not
depend on the form of the hazard
 
Thomas  shows that the probability of changing industries increases relative to the probability of nding
a job in the same industry when explicitly modeling unemployment durations

it further to thirteen weeks has a proportionately smaller e ect In most of our analysis we thus
report results using a window size of ve weeks
Figure  on page  here
Table  on page  here
Table  on page  shows means of most relevant variables for the full sample and for the
restricted sample with strictly positive onthejob training The subsample di ers from the full
sample in several aspects Trained workers have more experience work longer hours are more
likely to be unionized Related to our parameters of interest they have higher 	initial
 wages
and longer jobs as seen both in completed tenure and in the number of rightcensored jobs ie
the balance of the destination frequencies Turning to the sample frequencies of the three exit
states trained workers appear to be more likely to avoid nonemployment when leaving a job
Furthermore as a rst indication of a possible industryspecicity of training conditional on nding
a job within ve weeks trained workers are more likely to nd a job in the same industry
  
Thus
the di erence in sample frequencies of destinations between trained workers and the full sample
would lead us to conclude that training confers industryspecic skills The di erence in transitions
to nonemployment indicates an increase in labor force attachment which would seem inconsistent
with pure rmspecicity of training These observations provide a suggestive starting point for the
duration analysis in the following chapters
In the next section we develop a multivariate framework giving us more insight into the relation
between inter and intrasectoral transitions
  Empirical framework
In this section we give a brief review of the econometric models used
  
 We rst go into some
detail concerning the duration 	single exit
 model which is similar to the models used in previous
  
The balance of destinations are censored observations  individuals who either disappeared temporarily from
the dataset for whom it was impossible to reconstruct in what industry they detained their next job or who are still
at their job at the last interview during that job tenure nonmovers
 
For a more extensive expostion see Lancaster 

papers  The multiple destination model follows  We then derive two specializations the competing
risks model and a sequential or separable model  As we show it is possible to distinguish between
the two models in the data by a fairly intuitive test allowing us to concentrate on the appropriate
model in further analysis 
  Single exit duration models
Duration models are based on a random variable T representing the time until exit from a job 
The hazard rate   t is dened as the instantaneous probability of an event occuring in period t
conditional on the event not having occured until now
  t  lim
dt  
Prob t  T   t dtjT  tdt 
and is equal to f tS t where S t is the survivor function   F  t and f t  dS tdt the
density  Thus the hazard can also be written as   t  lnS tt  From this a useful identity
is
S t  exp 
Z
t
 
  sds 
It can be shown that the integrated hazard has a unit exponential distribution  Specication of the
hazard rate denes the distribution of durations and vice versa 
Covariates can be modeled to aect the distribution in various ways  The parametric methods
used in this paper assume an accelerated failure	time model
T  k

 tk

 x 

where k

 t is a transformtion of time and k

 x a proportionality factor  Hence any two persons
diering in their xs have the same baseline duration distribution of k

 t but dier in their observed
event times by a constant proportional factor of k

 x

k

 x

  In the simplest specication k

 t 
t and k

 x  exp X  Throughout this paper the specication of the proportionality function

in exponential form is maintained  This allows us to rewrite  as a linear regression model
log T  X    u 
In the case of a constant hazard log T   X  is just the integrated hazard which implies that
expu follows an Exponential distribution but generalizations lead to Weibull Gamma and Normal
distributions
  
  If u had a normal distribution and censoring were not a problem this could be
estimated by OLS  However most data contains censored spells and this needs to be reected in
the likelihood 
Another possibility is the proportional hazard specication
tx  

k
 
t

k
 
x 	
In this case

k

t is the baseline hazard function common to all individuals  Now two persons
di
ering in their xs di
er in their hazard by a constant proportionality factor of

k
 
x



k
 
x
 
 
The advantage inherent to proportional hazard models is the possibility of estimating

k
 
x
independently of the baseline hazard in a partial likelihood approach Cox   However inference
as to the expected duration is not possible  On the other hand its ease of use allows inference on
a number of other dimensions as we will see further on 
In both cases the loglikelihood contribution of an observed exit from employment is just fu
if not censored and Su if censored and using ft   tSt we can write this as
l  
X
i
  c
i
 log u
i
  logSu
i
 
where c
i
is an indicator variable equal to unity if an observation is censored 
Choice of the wrong distribution in estimation may lead to misspecication and hence biased
results particularly in duration analysis

  However for inference on the quantitative e
ect of the
 
See Lancaster   for more details
 
 Meyer  Sueyoshi   McCall  compares Weibull estimates with semiparametric estimates

covariates  specifying the duration distribution is useful Following the preliminary analysis in the
previous section  we decided to use distribution functions which allow for singlepeaked hazards
The present paper presents results using Gamma and lognormal specications  with some results
also available for the monotonous hazard Weibull specication The results we obtain are of course
conditional on having chosen the correct baseline hazard 
For some of our results  it is not necessary to know the distribution of duration In the case of
a proportional hazard model  a partial likelihood can be derived Denote by t j the jth observed
exit time  x j the characteristics of the individual exiting at time t j  and R
j
the risk set at t j 
ie the individuals who could still have exited at this time Then the Cox partial likelihood is
l 
J
X
j 
 

log

k

 x j   log
X
k R
j

k

 x j



which does not depend on

k

 t Furthermore  by simply redening the risk set R
j
to include only
multiple observations for the same individual  it is straightforward to control for multiplicative
individual heterogeneity in the hazard function
  
We will use the partial likelihood approach in
the analysis of multiple destinations  as explained in the next section
  Multiple destinations
The analogous quantity to the hazard rate in a multiple destination framework is the transition
intensity  
m
 tx Let d
m
be a dummy variable equal to unity if exit occurs to destination m Then
the transition intensity is dened as the instantaneous probability of departure to destination m
given survival to t

m
 tx  lim
dt
Prob t  T   t dt d
m
 jT  txdt 
 
See Lancaster   for more details

The hazard function is equal to the sum of transition intensities over all possible destinations m 
  tx 
M
X
m 

m
 tx 
and the survivor function is dened as by 
For any given individual we observe a M vector of indicators fd
m
g and exit time t besides
the covariates x
  
 The contribution to the likelihood is given by the probability that she left for
destination m at time t 
P  left for m at time t  
m
 txS tx 	

which can be rewritten as
p d

     d
m
 tx  exp
 
 
Z
 

M
X
m 

m
 sds

M
Y
m 

m
 tx
d
m
		
For our purposes it is useful to specify a number of dierent probabilities First dene the
marginal probabilities of the destinations ie the probability that when exit occurs it occurs to
destination m Integrating 	
 over t yields

m

Z
 

S s
m
 sds 	
Another useful measure is the probability of choosing destination m over destination k where fm kg
is a subset of M  For instance as pointed out in Section  we are interested in the probability
of changing sectors conditional on switching jobs and on t and the probability of nding a job
conditional on leaving the current job and on t With 	
 the former can be seen to be
M

 t 
P  left for sector  in period t
P  left for sector  in period t  P  left for sector in period t
as h 



 tx


 tx  

 tx
	
 
Note that censoring in this context can be modeled as another destination  and a censoring indicator can thus
be subsumed into the M indicators
	
where  period t is understood to mean  between t and t  h In general M
 
 t is timedependent
and will depend on the estimated baseline hazards for each risk However in the context of the
proportional hazard model with k
 
 x  exp x  the sign of the derivative of M
 
 t with respect
to a covariate x
j
is timeinvariant
M
 
 t
x
j


 
 t 
 j
   
 
 t  

 t 

 t    
 
 t 
 j
 

 t 
j


 
 t  

 t



 
 t

 t

 
 t  

 t

  
j
  
 j
 	
Thus sign M

 tx
j
  sign  
j
  
 j
 which does not depend on the destinationspeci
c
hazards a very useful property of the proportional hazard models The probability of 
nding a job
once the current job has ended was de
ned in Section  as
M
job
 t 

 
 t  

 t
 t
	
where  t is de
ned as in 	 as the sum of the destinationspeci
c transition intensities The
derivative of 	 with respect to a covariate x
j
is
M
job
 t
X
j



 t

P

i 

i
 t


 
 t  
 j
  
j
  

 t  
j
  
j
  	
which may be of ambiguous sign However by aggregating all job exits irrespective of industry
of the next job held ie 
job
 
 
 

 we 
nd an equivalent expression to 	 which can be
unambiguously signed
  Competing risk model
Now consider a person drawing from M independent distributions of tenure f
m
 t
m
 hazards 
m

and survivor functions S
m
 t
m
  expf
R
t
m


m
 sdsg Each represents the risk of exiting from the
present job to destination m However only the smallest realization t  min
m
ft
m
g is observed
hence the term  competing All other draws are right	censored Then the likelihood of observing
an exit to destination m is the product of the observed density of distribution m 
m
 tS
m
 t and

the probability that all other draws are larger than t 
Q
j   m
S
j
 t Using  and the independence
of t
m
 
P  exit to m in period t   
m
 tS
m
 t
Y
j   m
S
j
 t 
  
m
 t exp
 
 
Z
t

 
m
 sds

exp



 
X
j   m
Z
t

 
j
 sds



  
m
 t exp



 
X
j
Z
t

 
j
 sds



  
m
 tS t 
It can be seen that  is equivalent to  with  
m
 t  
m
 t On the other hand  using  to
write the likelihood of an individual observation 
p d

     d
m
 tx 
M
Y
m 



 
m
 uS
m
 u
M
Y
j   m
S
j
 u



d
m

M
Y
m 
 
m
 u
d
m
M
Y
m 
S
m
 u

M
Y
m 
L
m
	
where independence of the distributions of all T
m
was assumed  and L
m
  
m
 u
d
m
S u
m
 Since L
m
is equivalent to the log
likelihood of a duration model given by   it can be estimated separately
The contribution of an observed exit to destination n   m to likelihood L
m
is thus the same as
that of a censored observation in the duration model Again  a partial likelihood can be derived
in the case of the proportional hazards model  where the model partial likelihood is the product of
the destination
specic partial likelihoods
  
The assumption of independence is restrictive  though
often seen in the literature

 
See Lancaster   Chapter  for more details
 
Eg Belzil   Booth  Satchell  

   Sequential model
It is of interest to distinguish the competing risks model from another specialisation of the multiple
destination model  Call it a sequential model for reasons which will become apparent  Consider
the case where transition intensities are identical up to a timeindependent proportionality factor
k
 m
 i e 
 
m
 t  k
 
 t xk
m
 x
m
 
Using  and cancelling out the common factor k
 
 t x we obtain a proportional intensity model
with proportionality factor 
m
dened as
 
m
 tx
 tx

k
m
 x
m

P
M
j 
k
j
 x
m

 
m
 k 	
Then the marginal probability of destination m as dened by 	 can be written as

m

Z
 

S s
m
 sds
 
m
Z
 

S s sds
 
m
Z
 

S s
f s
S s
ds
 
m
Thus 
m
 the probability that when exit occurs it occurs to destination m is simply the propor
tionality factor associated with transition intensity m  If k

 x
m
  exp x
m
 then 
m
and the
marginal probability 
m
take the form of a logit model


m
 
m

exp x
m

P
K
j 
exp x
j


Note that the commonality of timedependent components of the hazard across destinations is a
necessary condition for this result to hold  Assume it does not  Then 
m
is a function of time and

m

Z
 

S s
m
 sds

 Z
 
 
Ss s
m
sds
 
Z
 
 

m
sfsds
which cannot be estimated as a standard logit model  In fact since in this case the baseline
transition intensities dier across destinations it is more appropriate to use the competing risks
model 
If the assumption holds we can rewrite the model as
 
m
tx    k

t x



k
m
x


m
 
where x

are the variables included in the estimation of the common baseline hazard x

are those
included in the estimation of the marginal probabilies of destinations possibly overlapping and

j
 j     the parameters associated with each model  This is why we call this a sequential model 
It implies that the process determining spell duration is completely separable from the process
determining destination  In other words there is one set of parameters determining when a worker
leaves a rm and another set of parameters determining her labor market activity afterwards  Each
component can be estimated separately to obtain consistent estimates of the s k

as a standard
duration model k

as multinomial logit or probit
 
  The logit model thus denes the likelihood
for all observations conditional on separation 
An obvious implication is that inference as to the eect of covariates on the length of jobs will
not be aected by the extension to multiple exit states  By including training variables in x

 the
eect of training on the choice of sector after job separation can be analyzed  Note that we can
compute the signs of M

x
j
and M
job
x
j
from the logit estimates in the same way as for the
proportional hazard model 
A simple test can be performed between the appropriateness of the sequential or the competing	
risks formulation by estimating a logit model of choice of destination on all person	jobs which have
ended irrespective how long the preceding job  Under the null hypothesis of the appropriateness
 
Of course  we are assuming that errors for each component are independent

of   the logit model does not depend on tenure on the last job held We present results for this
test in the empirical section
  Results
We start out with a discussion of the results obtained in the singleexit duration model as these
results are comparable with those obtained by other authors  Parent forthcomingb Lynch b
  Duration analysis
Panel  a of Table 	 on page 
	 reports estimates of the eect of training variables using gamma
lognormal and Weibull distributions of duration The qualitative results are robust to the specica
tion of the baseline distribution and in the discussion below we concentrate on results obtained for
the gamma distribution
 
The training variables are all signicant and of substantial impact Con
sistent with previous results training on the current job and othejob training increase expected
tenure whereas training received on previous jobs increases mobility
Tables 	 and  here
Contrary to previous studies the use of a parametric duration distribution allows us to perform
some inference on expected durations Computing the expected tenure with and without training
permits us to quantify the net impact of onthejob training ie the increase in expected tenure after
time spent on the training program measured as fulltime equivalent weeks has been deducted
The following example results for which are reported in Table  on page 
	 will serve to clarify
this
Consider an individual having 
 years of labor market experience acquired on three dierent jobs
with no previous training and working  hours on the current job This is an average individual
in our sample His
 
expected tenure will then be approximately 	 weeks Assuming he receives
 
The Weibull model is a restricted versions of the Gamma distribution  The relevant parameter restrictions can
be rejected at the  percent level  The Lognormal specication is rejected on the basis of a LR test with test statistic
of    The statistic is  
 
  with a  percent critical value of  	 
 
The coe
cient on the included dummy for the sex of the individual is small on the order of one percent and
not signicant on a 	 percent level 


training  he can expect to spend about  hours on training over the duration of the current job  or
about  weeks of full time equivalent
  
Training increases his expected tenure by about  weeks 
with an upper bound of the twosided 	 percent con
dence interval of  weeks Expressed in
expected average weekly hazards  the value is  percent before training Training decreases the
expected average value to  percent  but subtracting the duration of the training spell from total
expected tenure and recomputing training intensity  the net hazard is   slightly higher than
without the training spell The result also holds when using the lognormal distribution
Another possibility is to compute the impact on the average median worker
 
The median
worker in our sample has an expected duration of 	 weeks Setting hours of training to zero
leads to an expected duration of 	 weeks If all workers were then trained for  hours  the
median workers expected duration rises to 	 weeks
 
In the current speci
cation  we do not control for heterogeneity in the parametric models Results
from the partial likelihood estimates reported later show that controlling for heterogeneity is likely
to increase the eect of training The resultant increase of the parameter on training in the Cox
partial likelihood is on the order of  percent  with associated standard errors about twice as large
Results would still hold approximately
This example illustrates a 
rst conclusion of this paper We cannot reject the hypothesis that
the increase in tenure is actually less than the time spent on the training program  and that training
thus has no net impact on tenure with the 
rm providing the training Another way to put this
result is that the estimated increase in expected tenure due to training can be fully attributed to
the length of the training spell itself In other words  expected training does not increase the net
working time the worker spends with the training employer  con
rming  it seems  popular fears as
expressed in the initial quotation The same result obtains if we include weeks of training rather
than total hours of training over expected tenure This result obviously depends on the speci
cation
  
Again  these numbers approximately reect sample averages The sample mean of hours worked per week is 
hours
 
Formally  we compute the expected duration evaluated at the  percentile for the whole sample  and take the
average
 
Performing the same exercise with the lognormal distribution of tenure leads to values of     and 	

weeks  with a lower bound of the condence interval on the latter value at 	 weeks This reects the form of the
duration distribution  which is more tailheavy for the lognormal The conclusion  however  still holds
	
of the duration distribution  but it seems robust to variations thereof It holds for the typical and
for the median worker  suggesting that  though positive  the impact of training on tenure may have
been overstated
 
Of course it can be argued that though it does not hold for the median worker 
there are still workers for whom the net impact is positive Our aim here is not to assert that there
is never any eect  but to cast doubt on the assertion that there always is positive eect
The question then arises whether training actually confers rmspecic abilities  as has been the
general conclusion in the literature The results here cast doubt on that conclusion An analysis
of the mobility eects of training may allow to answer this question  and will be the subject of the
next subsections
  Sequential model
As a rst step to the estimation of transition intensities  we add to the previous singleexit duration
model a multinomial logit model of sectoral allocation
 
process The underlying assumption here
is that the singleexit model correctly captures the determinants of exit  of which training does not
seem to be one  but that a secondstage model of sectoral allocation is required In other words 
the duration model captures any factors common to all three destinations
Table  here
Panel a	 of Table  on page 
 presents multinomial logit estimates of the reducedform pa
rameters of sectoral allocation  the three categories being the usual ones used in this paper
 
The
probability of entering nonemployment conditional on leaving a job decreases with experience and
tenure Unionized workers are more likely to nd a job than nonunionized workers  but the number
of jobs held in the past decreases the probability of nding a job However  these variables do not
seem to aect the probability of a sectoral change On the other hand  the probability of a sectoral
change decreases with experience at the start of the job and with hours worked on the job
 
In results not reported here  we have performed a fair amount of sensitiviy analysis  and the results are quite
robust to sample selection and specication issues
 
To ease terminology  we treat nonemployment as another sector
 
The transition window in Table  is set to ve weeks Results for windows of one and nine weeks do not dier
signicantly

Turning to the training variables  the most striking result is the absence of any eect of training
with the last employer Neither the probability of employment nor the probability of sectoral
change are aected by training with the last employer More in line with a model of sectorspecic
training  training received with previous employers in the same industry other industries decreases
increases the probability of sectoral move
 
Adding to these results those from the previous section  we could conclude that onthejob
training neither increases tenure with the training rm in an economically meaningful way  nor
aects sectoral allocation Both results are consistent with a model of general training This would
obviously conict with the interpretation we can give to the coecients on training received with
previous employers
However  the model does not pass the test expounded in Section 		 The coecient on tenure
in the last job before separation is signicantly greater than zero Furthermore  results for a exible
specication in tenure reported in Panel b show that the time dependency for all three destinations
dier substantially

Hence  our test rejects the appropriateness of the sequential model  and we
would favor a competing risks model And the result that training has no eect on sectoral allocation
must seem premature at this stage 
  Competing risks
As a next step  we estimate a competing risks model in a proportional hazards setting This allows us
to quantify the impact of training on each destinationspecic risk as well as on the probability of a
sectoral move and on labor force attachment Contrary to the sequential model previously estimated 
time to exit and choice of exit are modeled jointly Table 
 on page 	 reports coecients on training
variables

Column a is the hazard model as already reported earlier Columns b through d
report coecients from a model with the three competing destinations job in a dierent industry 
jobs in the same industry  and no job found  nonemployed Column e reports coecients
 
All di erences in coecients are signicantly di erent from zero at the  percent level

The joint hypothesis that tenure has no e ect in all destinations can be easily rejected

Estimates using the accelerated failuretime models of Section  yielded the same signs for the training variables
but in those models the sign of the probability of sectoral change depends on all coecients of the model and can
only be approximated by the comparison we provide here Results for those models are available on demand

when aggregating the two former categories into a category  job found without distinguishing the
industry in which the next job is located The results were obtained assuming a transition window
of ve weeks
Table  here
The eects of other variables reported in Table  on page 	 are as follows Women are
less likely to change sector
 and more likely to transit into nonemployment than men
 though
no dierences seem to exist as to the transition intensity to sameindustry jobs In all transition
intensities
 education has no signicant eect Experience increases transition intensities to both
industries
 but reduces transitions out of employment Though this might seem counterintuitive
at rst glance
 remember that the eect on the overall hazard is negative
 thus implying that more
experienced workers are less likely to separate from their current job
 but upon separation are more
likely to stay employed The number of jobs ever held decreases both job transitions
 but increases
the transition intensity to nonemployment
 possibly serving as an indicator for people with a lower
labor force attachment Usual hours worked on the current job are correlated with lower transition
intensities out of the current industry
 but increases the intrasectoral transition intensity
  
Jobs
with higher initial wages are correlated with lower transition intensities to job in other industries
and out of employment
 but wages have no eect on intrasectoral transition intensities
The coecients of interest are those on onthejob training All coecients on training with
the current rm are negative
 implying the increase in tenure observed earlier
 though the present
specication does not allow us quantify the relative impacts Barring selection aspects
 which we
will explore later
 this implies that training is correlated with higher rmattachment However

it is clear from the estimates that training has dierent eects on each risk Thus
 the coecient
of onthejob training is smaller in absolute value for transitions to sameindustry jobs than for
transitions to jobs in other industries Furthermore
 whereas training in other industries has no
signicant eect on transitions to sameindustry jobs
 training received in the same industry has no
  
This may be coherent with a multidimensional utility function and the idea that hours worked is an industry
characteristic  Since the mean industryspecic eect of hours is captured by the industry dummy the hours variable
captures any variations beyond this  Higher hours in the current industry make other industries seem more attractive
for a given wage and wage oer  I thank David Margolis for pointing this out to me 

e ect on transitions to jobs in other industries and training received in other industries increases
these transitions suggesting industryspecicity of training Previously received training never has
any e ect on transition intensities out of employment whether acquired in the current or another
industry Finally o thejob training does not seem to have any impact on job transitions but
reduces transition intensities to nonemployment This is what we analyze more formally furtheron
using the conditional probabilities discussed earlier
Table  here
Table  on page  reports results when heterogeneity is controlled for in the Cox partial
likelihood framework The tenureincreasing e ect of training is increased by about 	 percent
There no longer seems to be any di erential e ect of training with the current employer according
to destination This pattern seems more in line with rmspecic training Remember from Section
 though that the quantitative e ect of of this e ect is negligible Furthermore the e ect
of previously received training reduces the overall hazard irrespective of the industry in which
training was received but this e ect seems to come entirely from a reduction of the transition
intensity into nonemployment The interpretation in our model is that wage o ers from any sector
have become relatively more attractive This belies rmspecicity and points towards general or
industryspecic training
Thus results from an analysis of the e ect on transition intensities do not provide a clear picture
Possibly and not surprisingly training has both general and specic components A clearer picture
appears when we compute the conditional probabilities laid out earlier Tables 
 to 	 on pages
 to  provide the empirical counterparts to Table  in Section  Column a in Table 

computes the approriate probabilities for the results reported in Table 	 and Column b for
those in Table  In columns c and d we control for the fact that the NLSY oversamples
certain demographic groups and columns e and f reports results for when we include controls
for whether or not the trainee completed the program or not
The rst row of Table 
 shows the e ect of training with the current employer on the probability
of a sectoral move when changing jobs  M
 
 t ONCJT  It is consistently negative though those

speci cations which control for individual heterogeneity provide noisier estimates The impact of
training on previous jobs diers with its source In most speci cations if training was acquired in
the same industry row  sectoral mobility is reduced If it was acquired in a dierent industry
row  sectoral mobility is increased These results suggest that training has a component which is
sectorspeci c since the signs of the eect of all three onthejob training variables are inconsistent
with the mobility patterns of either  rmspeci c or general human capital
As reported in Table 	 on page 
	 only about  percent of training is not completed Controlling
for incomplete training duration does not change coecients on completed training as reported
here
  
Columns b d and f control for individual heterogeneity and the results suggest that a large
amount of the mobility patterns associated with training may be due to this kind of heterogeneity
Note however that this generally occurs because of increased standard errors and not because
the sign of the point estimate for the probability of a sectoral move changes However controls for
heterogeneity also take out any eect constant per individual but heterogeneous in the data possibly
hiding more general patterns In Tables 
 to 	 we explore the impact of control for gender A
comparison of Panel a of Table 
 on page  with its theoretical counterpart Table  on page 

remains inconclusive However once individual heterogeneity is controlled for the pattern is clearer
While the coecients for training with the current  rm would suggest that training is  rmspeci c
the eect of previous training in the same industry seems more consistent with industryspeci c
training as are to a lesser degree those on training acquired in other industries Training acquired
in the same industry reduces the transition intensity to nonemployment which suggests industry
speci c or general training The eect of training on the overall hazard con rms this Turning again
to the probability of sectoral moves in Table 	 on page  reinforces support for the interpretation
of training as industryspeci c capital Both training with the current  rm and with prior employers
in the same industry reduce the probability of a sectoral move Inconsistent with the expounded
theory training received in other industries reduces the probability of quitting the current industry
  
Not reported here  coecients on incompleted training generally are of same magnitude and opposite sign as
those on completed training  cancelling out any eect of completed training

For women  the pattern is less clear Whereas the eect of dierent types of training on the
transition intensity to nonemployment again suggest rmspecic training even after controlling for
heterogeneity  all types of training uniformly reduce both job transition intensities  which our theory
cannot accommodate The eect on the overall hazard again suggests rmspecicity Again turning
to the probability of sectoral moves  Table  shows that training with the current rm reduces the
probability of a sectoral move  consistent with industryspecicity  but previous training in the
industry actually increases the probability of a sectoral change However  all these probabilities
are not signicantly dierent from zero  which may suggest either rmspecic training or general
training
This is possibly linked to dierent occupational patterns of men and women  which are not
controlled for in this paper As an example  if women are more likely to be in clerical occupations 
and training occurs for these occupations  it may well be that employment options are increased in
other industries as well This subject remains to be explored
  
The coecient of training acquired
in other industries by men on the probability of a sectoral move implies that although training
was received in a dierent industry  it reduces the probability of leaving the current industry For
women  a dierent story emerges training received in the current industry actually increases the
possibility of leaving the current industry If there exist 	entrance
 or 	feeder
 industries which are
used as starting points for careers which end in other industries 
  
such a pattern could be observed
if our data consists primarily of men who have already left the 	feeder
 industry and of women
who are still overwhelmingly in their 	feeder
 industries

This leaves substantial room for future
research
The fact that controls for heterogeneity substantially weaken the reported eect on the proba
bility of sectoral mobility may be due to selection problems referred to in Section  If training is
dispensed only to individuals who are less mobile  then measuring hours of training without controls
for individual heterogeneity in the baseline hazard could lead to the observed correlation between
  
See McCall   for a test of occupational matching though not mobility
  
See Jovanovic  Nyarko   for a possible theoretical explanation

See McCall   for some evidence on 	feeder
 occupations In the context of intrarm mobility Baker Gibbs
 Holmstrom   provide evidence of occupational career ladders within an organization

training and mobility  Training proxies for intrinsic mobility observable by the employer  In that
case the same should be true for an indicator of training receipt  To explore this further we re
placed hours of training by an indicator for the incidence of training with the current company as
regressor  Results reported in Table  on page  columns a and b do not seem to support
this interpretation  Incidence is robust to the speci	cation of heterogeneity except when used for
training acquired in other industries  Incidence of training is correlated with a decline in sectoral
mobility as long as training is acquired in the same industry where it is not important whether the
current employer or previous employers provided it  This would seem at odds with selection purely
based on mobility 
A di
erent selection story would say that training is not dispensed arbitrariy and that whatever
characteristic the employer uses as a selection criterion may be spuriously correlated with di
erences
in mobility patterns  To explore this we restricted our sample to those observations for workers
who had already received training with some previous employer and who have changed employers
since  If there were a systematic di
erence between workers receiving training and others then
it could be expected that any residual mobility e
ect of training would be captured without con
trols for heterogeneity i e  the subsample of observations thus selected provides adequate control
for selectionbased heterogeneity  Table  columns c shows results without controls for het
erogeneity  This selected subset of workers homogeneous in the respect that they have already
been selected at least once for training still shows the by now typical pattern of sectoral mobility
corresponding to the case of industryspeci	c training though the e
ect is weaker than for the full
sample  Thus the mobility patterns found so far cannot be solely attributed to a selection bias into
training  However column d highlights the fact that controls for heterogeneity still increase the
standard errors thus reducing the level of signi	cance substantially without changing the signs of
the computed probabilities 
These results suggest that at least in part the endogeneity of the separation decision with respect
to training might still be biasing our results  A valid exogenous instrument for separation that
has been frequently used in labor economics is that of plant closure  The resultant displacement

of workers is assumed to be the result of factors outside the worker rm match
  
Restricting
the sample to displaced workers yields the results reported in column e of Table  Here the
probability of sectoral change is decreased by training acquired in the same industry and increased
by training in other industries though none are signicant possibly to the small sample size

These results for this small sub sample of workers would again seem to indicate the presence of
industry specic training
We next turn to the conditional probability of nding a job expressed by M
job
as dened in
Section  Tables 	 to 
 report results for the same specications explored previously The results
are fairly robust across all specications revealing the benecial eects of training with respect to the
probability of being employed after a job separation Training whether on or o the job increases
the probability of re employment conditional on separation Again this seems inconsistent with
pure rm specicity Some dierences from this general pattern however are worth pointing out
As Table 	 on page  shows though positive the employment eect of training with the current
rm is not signicantly dierent from zero when excluding the oversampled population Though this
may again suggest rm specicity it disappears once the eect of incomplete training is taken out
columns e and f Employment attachment is then increased for all types of training possibly
giving an indication of training serving as a signal The positive employment attachment eect of
training seems to be equally strong for training acquired in the same industry as for training with
the current rm but weaker if training was acquired in another industry Although our theory
does not provide much guidance in evaluating the relative size of the impact this may suggest
industry specicity The probability of receiving a job oer from the own sector is stronger
Turning to gender specic results in Table  on page 	 we again note some dierences in
the eect of training on employment attachment probabilities between men and women possibly
related to occupational mobility patterns Whereas training received with the current employer
  
See Neal   for an application to identify industryspecic informal training  experience An extensive
analysis of the longterm income eects of displacement is found in Jacobson	 LaLonde 
 Sullivan  

Regressions for displaced workers controlling for heterogeneity did not yield results Only  worker in the
sample experienced displacement more than once The sample means show that their jobs are in general in areas of
higher unemployment	 that completed tenure is lower	 and that they are paid lower wages The sample average of
training is actually higher than for the full sample	 but otherwise the sample means do not seem to dier substantially
from the full sample

increases employment attachment for both sexes  for men it turns out that the eect of training
received with previous employers in the same industry is stronger than for training received with
employers in other industries For women  however  any previously acquired training increases labor
force attachment by about the same factor
Replacing hours of training with its incidence Table  on page   columns a and b leads
to the insigni	cance of training received in the current industry  though the signs are still positive
when heterogeneity is controlled for The strongest eect seems to come from training in other
industries Columns c and d reports results for hours of training when incidence is added as
supplementary explanatory variable instead of replacing hours as in columns a and b
  
When
both incidence and hours of training are included as explanatory variables  the eect of training
with the current employer is still very imprecisely estimated However  hours of training received
with previous employers have an eect above and beyond a pure incidence eect  particularly when
heterogeneity is controlled for Thus  even if though selection into training may play a role with the
current company  the duration of training received with previous companies does show a positive
impact on the probability of employment  inconsistent with a pure selection argument
Finally  the evidence for displaced workers having training in other industries  column e  is
unclear  but the eect of previous training in the same industry  though too noisy an estimate 
points in the direction consistent with non
	rm
speci	c training general or industry
speci	c Note
also that the employment eect of o
the
job training  which signi	cantly increases the probability
of employment after a job separation in most of the speci	cations considered  does displaced workers
no good If o
the
job training serves as a preparation for a career move  then displaced workers
are possibly surprised by their displacement  and cannot focus such activities

  
The coe cients on incidence do not change substantially when duration is included

Note however that Jacobson et al  point out that earnings for displaced workers decrease several quarters
before displacement indicating that workers should have ample notice of displacement

  Conclusion
In this paper  we have used the detailed data on formal onthejob training available in the NLSY
to reevaluate the mobility eects of such training We report estimates on the quantitative impact
of training as well as on the intra and intersectoral mobility patterns associated with training
We nd that although training does increase expected tenure with the training rm  the increase
does not seem to exceed the length of the training spell itself  whether evaluated at the mean or
the median duration of job spells Net working time is unaected by training This would be
consistent with human capital theory if the capital formed through training were applicable to a
number of rms  either throughout the economy general human capital or within the same industry
industryspecic human capital It conrms results obtained on the remuneration of training by
the training rm and subsequent employers  which showed that training was remunerated by the
latter at the same rate as by the training rm itself  suggesting transferability of human capital
acquired through training
To determine the degree of specicity  we analyze the mobility patterns of workers after job
separation  concentrating on the sectoral mobility  with nonemployment modeled as a third sector
Conditional on leaving the current rm  a multinomial logit nds no eect of training on the sectoral
allocation of workers However  we test and reject the sequential multinomial model in favor of a
competing risks specication
The results from a proportional hazard specication of the competing risks model provide sub
stantial evidence for industryspecicity of training  though the mobility patterns also reveal some
rmattachment related with training The eect of training with the current rm seems to uni
formly reduce transition intensities to all destinations  though as the result on duration implies  the
increase may not be substantially more than the time spent on training programs
Consistent with a model of sectorspecic human capital  training acquired in the current indus
try  whether with the current employer or with previous employers  is associated with a reduction
in the probability of a sectoral move Strongest evidence for industryspecicity comes from men 
for whom the probability of a sectoral change is substantially reduced by training within the same
	
industry  The industryspecicity is especially present when incidence of training is used instead of
total hours of training suggesting that the interplay of training and mobility may be more complex
than what can be captured by hours of training  However the pattern provided by training acquired
in other industries does not conform well with a matchingaugmented model of human capital 
The evidence for sectorspecicity from the probability of employment attachment is less strong 
Though training with previous employers generally increases employment attachment the eect of
training with the current rm seems less clear 
Overall the evidence points to a strong sectorspecic character of training when mobility pat
terns are taken into account  This helps to partially explain why previous studies have found that
rms remunerate training received with prior employers though subsequent analysis should take
into account the industry in which prior training was acquired  However it increases the mystery
of why rms would pay for training which is of use to other employers as the same wage regressions
seems to show  More research in this area is thus called for 

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Table   Theoretical implications
Derivative of   
 

 


M

M
job
with respect to 
On the job training with current employer
Firmspecic                  
Industryspecic                  
General                  
On the job training with previous employer
dierent industry
Firmspecic                  
Industryspecic                  
General                  
On the job training with previous employer
same industry
Firmspecic                  
Industryspecic                  
General                  
 
 
is transition intensity to same industry   
 
to other industry   

to
nonemployment M
 
is the probability of changing sectors conditional on
switching jobs and on t  and M
job
is the conditional probability of being
employed after leaving the current job in t
 
Figure   Transition intensities

Figure   Transition intensities and transition windows

Table   Sample selection
No obs No persons
Base sample  
valid job observations  	  
 
excl military sample 		  

excl nonprivate co 
 
excl missing variables 

	 	
excl jobs starting before Jan 	 
	
 	
Only permanent transitions 
  
Spells  
 weeks 
 
Table 
Industry aggregation
Industry SIC codes Name
 	  Agricultureforestry and sheries
  
		 Mining
 			 Construction

 	 Manufacturing
 
	
	 Transportationcommunication public utilities
 	 Wholesale and retail trade
	 			 Financeinsurance and real estate
 	 		 Business and repair services
 		 Personal services
 	 Entertainment and recreation services
  	 Professional and related services
  		 Public administration
Table 
 Exit frequencies
as a function of window size
Window size in weeks     
Job in other industry   	  
Job in same industry      
Nonemployment 	 
  
Total number of observations   



Table   Training codes in NLSY
Code Onthejob Description
 Business school
 yes Apprenticeship program
 Vocational or technical institute
 Correspondence course
 yes Formal company training run by employer or military training
 yes Seminars or training programs at work not run by employer
	 Seminars or training programs outside of work
 Vocational rehabilitation center

 Other
 
Table   Sample means
Full sample Positive training
Tenure w Employer weeks   	
 
Actual exp since 
 	 	
Hrs per Wk at Job  	
Hourly Wage Cvtd Job  
	 
Wage set by Union Job  
Highest Grade completed years  
Number Unique jobs held   
Married  
Female 		 	
Next job Other industry  
Next job Same industry 
  
Job ends in nonemployment 	 
On the job training current hours  
 
ONJT current incomplete hours 
 

ONJT current weeks  
Prior ONJT  

of which in same industry 	  
Prior ONJT incomplete hours  
  
Prior ONJT weeks  
Othejob training hours   


Othejob training weeks 	   
Observations 	 
  
Transition window size is  ve weeks for means on transition data
	 
Table   Base speci cation
Duration analysis
Gamma Normal Weibull Cox
Onthejob training  	 
   

      	
Prior ONJT    
    
Othejob training    
    
Loglikelihood 	
 	
  
	
Parameter estimates from parametric duration models and Cox partial likelihood
model    obs  Dependent variable for the parametric models is log tenure 
Coecients for the Cox model are the negative of the eect on the baseline hazard 
Training variables in s of hours of training  All regressions include indicators
for sex union status race and marital status years of completed schooling weeks
of labor market experience hourly wage rates weekly hours local unemployment
rate plus region year and industry dummies  All variables are taken at the start
of the job  All coecients signi	cant at  percent level 
Table 
Impact of training programs
Duration analysis
Training program of   hours   weeks
Duration Gamma Log normal
in weeks
Standard worker 
 


    	   
  	
Median worker  	 	
    

 	     
 	
Increase in expected tenure due to on
the
job training received with
the current 	rm  See Table  and text for raw coecients and other
details   percent con	dence intervals in square brackets 
 
Conditional sectoral allocation
Other industry job Same industry job
Standard Standard
Estimate
Error
Estimate
Error
 a Linear time
Intercept      
On the job training
w last employer 	
 
 

 

other industry    
 

same industry  
 
  
O the job training    
Tenure  	  
Initial exp    
HoursWeek    

Wage  
 
 
 

Jobs ever held     	 
Union 
   


Schooling  
 
  
  
	
Female 	 
 	
 
Race  	   
 


Married 
 
  
 
	
 b Polynomial time
Tenure  
  
Tenure

     
Tenure

  	 	
Initial exp 
 	 
	 	
Experience

 
 
   
	
Experience

 
 	 
Parameter estimates from multinomial logit model    observations  Omitted
category is nonemployment  Training variables in s of hours of training tenure
and experience in s of weeks  Transition window length is  weeks  Estimates
from the regression in Panel 	b
 are available on demand  All coecients signicant
at  percent level except 	
 not signicant at  percent level 	
 not signicant at
 percent level 	
 not signicant at  percent level 
Table 
 Multinomial logit estimates

Table  
Proportionality factor
Cox partial likelihood
Base speci cation
Transition intensities
Other industry Non employment
Hazard Same industry Job
Onthejob training
Current job     		

	 
  
  
  

Prior other industry     
 

 


 
 
 
 

Prior same industry 
 
 
  
  
 

 

 
 
 
 

Othejob training   
 

 
 
 

 
 
  
 

Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models  Standard errors in parentheses    obs 
Onthejob training in s of hours othejob training in s of hours  For other details see
footnote to Table 	  For full results see Table   All coe
cients signicant at  percent level except
 not signicant at  percent level  not signicant at  percent level  not signicant at 
percent level as determined by a  
 
  test 

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Table  
Proportionality factor
Cox partial likelihood
Heterogeneity
Transition intensities
Other industry Non employment
Hazard Same industry Job
Onthejob training
Current job               
	  
 	 
 	 
 	 
 	 

Prior other industry  
 

 
  
 
	
 	  
 	 
 	 
 	

Prior same industry    
 

 
 
 
	
 	 
 	 
 	 
 	 

Othejob training 
 
 
 
 
	
 	 
 	 
 	 
 	 

Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models  Standard errors in parentheses    obs 
Onthejob training in s of hours othejob training in s of hours  For other details see
footnote to Table 	  For full results see Table   All coe
cients signicant at  percent level except
 not signicant at  percent level  not signicant at  percent level  not signicant at 
percent level as determined by a  
 
  test 
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Table  
Training coe cients
Cox partial likelihood
Men
Derivative of   
 

 


with respect to 
a No heterogeneity
Onthejob training
Current job  	
 	 

        
Prior other industry      



  	 	
Prior same industry 

 

  	

  	 
Othejob training    

 


 	  	
b Heterogeneity
Onthejob training
Current job    
   	   	
Prior other industry  
 
	 




  
   
Prior same industry  

 
	

 

 

    	

Othejob training     
      
  
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models    obs  For other details
see footnote to Table   All coecients signicant at  percent level except 	
 not
signicant at  percent level 	 not signicant at  percent level 	 not signicant at
 percent level as determined by a  
 
  testl 
	
Table  
Training coe cients
Cox partial likelihood
Women
Derivative of   
 

 


with respect to 
a No heterogeneity
Onthejob training
Current job  	  
    
    	  	
Prior other industry 

 
 
 e

	

 
    

Prior same industry 


 
 




 	
   	
Othejob training     

	
   
b Heterogeneity
Onthejob training
Current job    	  	
	  
 	  
Prior other industry 


   

   	 
Prior same industry  

 


 


  
 
  
Othejob training 

  	
 
	      
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models    obs  For other details
see footnote to Table   All coecients signicant at  percent level except 	
 not
signicant at  percent level 	 not signicant at  percent level 	 not signicant at
 percent level as determined by a  
 
  testl 

Table  
Probability of sectoral move
Cox partial likelihood
by gender
Men Women
Derivative of M
 
 t
with respect to  a b c d
Onthejob training
Current job    	    	

        	
Prior other industry    	    
	  		
  
 		
Prior same industry   
 


   
   
 	
	
Othejob training E  E  
   	   
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models    obs   
 
  values in
parentheses   
 
   
     

  
    	  For other details see footnote to Table
 
		
Table  
Probability of sectoral move
Cox partial likelihood
Displ 
Incidence Conditional workers
Derivative of M
 
 t
with respect to a b c d e
Onthejob training
Current job  	 	
    
    	   
	 	 
Prior other industry       	 
  	     
  
Prior same industry        	
 
     	
Othejob training  
      	 
	     
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes No
Observations        
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models    obs   
 
  values in parentheses 
 
 
   
     

  
    	  For other details see footnote to Table  
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Table  
Probability of employment attachment
Cox partial likelihood
by gender
Men Women
Derivative of M
job
 t
with respect to  a b c d
Onthejob training
Current job  	  
  

     

Prior other industry      

        

Prior same industry       	
 
 	  
Othejob training  	   
	  
 	    
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models    obs   
 
  values in
parentheses   
 
   
     

  
    	  For other details see footnote to Table
 
	
Table  
Probability of employment attachment
Cox partial likelihood
Hours and Displ 
Incidence Incidence workers
Derivative of M
 
 t
with respect to a b c d e
Onthejob training
Current job   	  

   	 
   
Prior other industry   
 	  	
   
 	  


Prior same industry   
 
  	 	
	E 
 
 	   
Othejob training 
    
 
 
   

  	 	 
  
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes No
Observations     
 
Parameter estimates from Cox partial likelihood models  Columns a and b report coecients
on incidence variables all others on s of hours of onthejob training and s of hours of
othejob training   
 
  values in parentheses   
 
   
     

  
    	  For other
details see footnote to Table 	 

